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 Chapter 2 
 From International Migration to Freedom 
of Movement and Back? Southern Europeans 
Moving North in the Era of Retrenchment 
of Freedom of Movement Rights 
 Roxana  Barbulescu 
 Whatever the weather ,  we must move together . (Message on poster popularising the 
Marshall Plan, 1950) 
2.1  Introduction 
 Europeans have always moved to European neighbouring countries to battle wars, 
study, work or start a family. Over time, mobility on the European continent has 
changed remarkably: if in the postwar period, Southern Europeans were recruited as 
guest workers via bilateral agreements established between states, the creation of 
freedom of movement allowed people to migrate freely and on their own choice. 
The consolidation and extension of freedom of movement rights continued as the 
European Union has grown “ever closer”, it gradually extended from workers and 
their families to include students, retirees, job seekers and every European Union 
citizen with suffi cient fi nancial resources to support her/his stay. Over time freedom 
of movement has gradually evolved in a form of international migration unique in 
the world which, encompasses a population of half a billion people and 32 countries 
(EU28, EEA and Switzerland). In the context of the economic crisis that has started 
in 2007, citizens and political elites in several member states are challenging in 
systematic manner the principle of freedom of movement for the fi rst time. At the 
EU level too, the hitherto progressive expansion of rights for freemovers which 
culminated with the introduction of Directive 38/2004 was stopped after in mid 
2000s. 
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 This chapter examines the transformation of freedom of movement as a particu-
lar policy area at the supranational, European level and then moves on to document 
and discuss the political and policy responses to the intensifi cation Southern 
Europeans’ migration to Northern Europe in times of economic crisis. It starts by 
process-tracing the evolution of the freedom of movement regime from the guest 
worker schemes, the hallmark of European labour mobility in postwar period. It 
then moves to its period of intense consolidation and Europeanisation at the policy 
and political level. Finally, it zooms-in how and to what extend this past trends have 
changed after the last two enlargements and the new South-North migration trig-
gered by the economic crisis. The chapter argues that the new South-North migra-
tion is taking place in an era of retrenchment of freedom of movement rights. The 
recent Eastward enlargements drive the political contestation of freedom of move-
ment rights and together with the worsening of economic conditions in North- 
Western EU countries have led to policy changes that effectively contract the rights 
of freemovers. Such retrenchment of rights announce the end of a “golden era” of 
freedom of movement as it becomes increasingly similar with international migra-
tion from third countries. The ongoing changes negatively affect all European citi-
zens including Southern Europeans moving in the EU since the start of the economic 
crisis. In particular, the young Southern Europeans who have been socialised and 
experienced Europe as a continent of free mobility because the contraction of rights 
comes at the time when they most need mobility rights to escape the fi nancial and 
economic crisis in their countries. 
2.2  South-North Mobility in the Postwar Europe: Guest 
Workers on Old Migratory Routes 
 In the postwar period, many Southern Europeans went to work in the more industri-
alised countries in the North of Europe as guest workers (Castles and Kosack  1973 ; 
Piore  1979 ; Hammar  1985 ; Messina  2007 ). War-ridden economies North-Western 
European countries recruited workers from a variety of countries but focused pri-
marily on the Mediterranean basin – Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, as well as 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Northern African countries – and their former colonies. 
Southern Europeans were amongst the most numerous migrant community in the 
countries. For example, in 1980, in Western Germany, Southern Europeans repre-
sented over a quarter of all foreign workers (Italians made up 14 % of all foreign 
workers, Greeks 6.6 %, Spaniards 4 % and Portuguese 2.5 % (Schmitter Heisler 
 1992 : 39 and Chap.  9 in this volume). Belgium and France received similar high 
numbers of Southern Europeans in the same period (see Chaps.  7 and  8 in this vol-
ume). Elsewhere in North-Western Europe, Southern Europeans were also numer-
ous. In the Netherlands, Southern Europeans who were categorised as 
‘Mediterranean’ made up 1.1 % of the total population of the country, with Spaniards 
rather than Italians being the most dominant, 0.8 % or 123,000 (Rath and Sagar 
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 1992 : 206). Compared with these countries, Britain was a deviant case in Northern 
Europe as it primarily recruited workers either from its colonies outside Europe or 
from and the Baltic states via the European Voluntary Workers Scheme (Kay and 
Miles  1988 ) There were, however, some exceptions. Italians workers concentrated 
in London and the large cities or in Bedford where they worked for the London 
Brick Company (see Chap.  10 in this volume). 
 As a rule, guest worker agreements were state-to-state deals that Southern 
European countries signed with France, Switzerland, and Belgium in the 1940s, and 
with Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria in 1950s and 1960s. The repeated 
recruitment in Southern Europe as well as the family members who soon joined the 
workers in Northern Europe carved a marked migratory route from the South to the 
North of Europe. In the Fordist-Keynesian regulation model, the guest worker 
scheme played an essential role. Imported foreign workers provided a secondary 
labour force. They offered Northern European countries a reliable and fast solution 
to shortages, an on demand ‘army of reserve workers’ as Marx called it ready to 
power heavy industries and presumably ready to return at the end of their contracts. 
More importantly and paradoxically, guest workers were also contributors to 
Northern European economies via fl exible pay-as-you go schemes which offered 
few social entitlements during what has been called the golden era of the welfare 
state. The majority of guest workers in postwar Europe were male, blue-collar 
workers who found employment in high-unionised industries. They were the ideal 
protected workers especially in conservative-corporatist varieties in Northern 
Europe. Yet as native workers in similar positions benefi ted of extended protections, 
foreign workers found themselves on fl exible welfare trajectories. 
 In 1973 and because of the Oil crisis, Germany suddenly stopped new recruit-
ments and most Western European governments followed suit by 1974. By the 
1980s, everywhere in Europe the old guest worker programmes came to a full stop: 
the foreign workers have gained either permanent permits, became citizens in the 
country where they lived or returned. 
 Envisaged as temporary programmes, guest worker schemes led instead to the 
permanent settlement of the postwar migrants. Rather than triggering a large-scale 
return migration of the postwar workers, worsening economic conditions made 
migrants remain in the country and bring their families. The Oil Crisis together with 
the major transition from industrial to service based economy caused high unem-
ployment, and deregulated the labour market with the logic that it would create new 
jobs. In particular, unemployment hit hard precisely the sectors in which foreign 
workers originally were recruited: the heavy industry, manufacture and mining. 
Also, native workers were now competing shoulder-to-shoulder with foreign work-
ers for fl exible work contracts and with women who were increasingly gaining 
access to paid work. In practice, these macro-economic changes prevented new 
recruitments from abroad. It also meant that many of the guest workers themselves 
entered unemployment and were in need of social protection just as native 
workers. 
 From the perspective of post-1973 crisis, the guest worker scheme seem as 
exceptional as the economic conditions in which it was born. The shortages of 
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labour force in key sectors of economy that characterised the early postwar years 
was the opposite of high unemployment that swept across North-Western Europe in 
1970s and 1980s just as much as generous state investment for reconstruction funds 
including the multibillion dollar Marshall Plan was the opposite of the debt states 
accumulated in the Oil Crisis. In fact, they seemed so unlikely that in 1986, the 
migration scholar Stephen Castles ( 1986 ) wrote ‘an obituary’ of the guest worker 
scheme in  International Migration Review . 
 The crisis had different impact for different communities of guest workers. 
Amersfoort et al. ( 1984 ) fi nd that that unlike the Turks, Tunisians and Moroccans, 
the migrants from Spain, Italy, Portugal and former Yugoslavia had high return 
rates. Moreover, emigration statistics of these countries report that departures 
declined signifi cantly since 1973. Studying the effect of the Oil Crisis on migration 
within European Union and the Nordic Community, Rinus Penninx ( 1986 ) notes 
that the only generalizable trend is that new infl ows “seem to diminish, if the free 
circulation zone as a whole is going through a period of stagnation or recession, 
ultimately, this leads to a less rapidly growing foreign population of member states” 
( 1986 : 957). On return migration, however, Penninx fi nds no general trend. For 
instance, the Portuguese community decreased in Western Germany and in France 
but it stabilized in Norway and the Netherlands and it increased in Luxembourg. 
 However, for Spain, Greece and to some extent Italy return migration was some-
where more signifi cant. Return was driven primarily by the accession of Spain and 
Greece to the EU and Italy’s  miracolo economico of the 1960s. The Southern 
enlargement marked by the accession of Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal together 
in 1986 had similar temporary restrictions introduced in the accession treaties as 
those applied for the Central and Eastern European states. In fact, the Southern 
enlargement was the fi rst time the European Community enforced temporary restric-
tions on freedom of movement of people. The restrictions were imposed for a period 
of 6 years after each enlargement although Straubhaar ( 1984 ) noted they were 
scheduled initially to run for 7 years in the case of Spain and Portugal. The period 
was reduced because of the unexpected  extremely low mobility of workers from 
these states. During the transition period, the number of Portuguese living in the EU 
increased by only 30,000 (3 %) while the number of Spanish citizens actually 
decreased by 25,000 (−5 %) (Dustmann et al.  2003 : 44; Entzinger  1978 ). 
 Noteworthy is that there was no real end of Southern Europeans’ migration story, 
no declaration or obituary was written for the South-North migratory route. The 
route did not disappear, it was transformed. While migration from the South to the 
North slowed down signifi cantly, the same routes were used by the returning 
Southern Europeans as well as Northern Europeans moving South. Soon after the 
accession of the Southern European states to the EU (with the exception of Italy 
who was one of the six founding members), mobility patterns on this migratory 
route changed their character and parts of these fl ows became increasingly similar 
to North-North intra-European mobility. While certain migration patterns remained 
stable (see for instance low-skilled Portuguese migration in Chap.  5 ), new Southern 
European fl ows that had little in common with the postwar migration also emerged. 
Similarly to what had been observed in other parts of the EU, young and educated 
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Southern European citizens headed to European cities in search for jobs but also to 
pursue cosmopolitan lifestyles and projects of self-realisation (Favell  2008 ; Recchi 
and Favell  2009 ). Finally, the emergence of a new migratory route in the reverse 
direction, running from the North to the South of Europe and the intensifi cation of 
migrations from Central and Eastern Europe to both Southern and Northern Europe 
clearly indicated the decline of the South-North route. 
 Comparing the Southern Europeans’ ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrations, one matter 
stands out. In the postwar Europe, they were able to work abroad because of the 
guest workers schemes while the more recent Southern Europeans have been able to 
move within the EU as Union citizens who enjoy freedom of movement rights. In 
the following section, I discuss the evolution of freedom of movement and its asso-
ciated rights. 
2.3  The Archaeology of European Freedom of Movement: 
From International Migrants to Freemovers 
 Some sort of freedom of movement exists for all people regardless of their national-
ity by virtue of holding a passport. However, not all passports are the same some 
passports carry different mobility rights across the world. Possessors of Afghan 
passports, for example, can travel freely to 28 countries at the same time that pos-
sessors of British, Finish and Swedish passports have near global mobility rights 
because they are able to enter freely to 173 of the 193 countries in the world (Henley 
and Partners Visa Restrictions Index  2013 ). The wide disparity in mobility rights 
has given rise what Stephen Castles ( 2005 ) calls “hierarchy of passports”. However, 
the kind of mobility regimes passports establish is rather limited as it only secures 
free entry but guarantees no right to residence in the country, no rights for family 
members or other post-entry rights. Before the establishment of the European 
Community and freedom of movement, Europeans travelled under the same condi-
tions as other international migrants using their passports and enjoyed limited rights 
once in the country. The emergence of a regional space for unrestricted mobility a 
profound change in the way the Europeans moved across the continent. Compared 
with similar regional projects such as NAFTA in North America, MERCOSUR in 
South America or the Euroasian Economic community, European freedom of move-
ment of people stands alone because in the European case, mobility lies at the heart 
of the EU and together with the freedom of movement of services, goods and capital 
forms the four core freedoms of the Union. To recall the centrality of freedom of 
movement of people within the EU and the progressiveness of the regional integra-
tion project in Europe, Adrian Favell ( 2014 ) calls it “the fourth freedom” of the 
EU. Others, on the other hand, see it as an anachronism for the contemporary narra-
tive on immigration. The editors of a leading EU law journal (Editorial Comments 
 2014 ) describe freedom of movement as a dream that turned into nightmare “legally 
over-complicated, politically abused allegedly costly and popularly 
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misunderstood?”. Indeed, monitoring reports on the implementation of freemovers 
rights have revealed repeatedly irregularities with the transposition of the Directive 
in practice (Shuibhne and Shaw  2014 ). In April 2014, the European Commission 
acknowledged the problem and adopted the Directive 54/2014 that sets new rules to 
ensure better implementation of the rights of workers and jobseekers. 
 Freedom of movement is not only a generous mobility regime but it also gener-
ates additional rights including social rights in the member states of destination 
(Bauböck  2007 ; Kostakoloupou  2007 ; Maas  2007 ; Olsen  2008 ). Nonetheless, a 
notable absence is the lack of political rights for mobile Europeans in national elec-
tions although recent mobilisation in favour of these rights have found new momen-
tum in the European public sphere (Shaw  2007 ; Barbulescu  2012 ; Baubock et al. 
 2012 ). The European freedom of movement therefore provides for ample entry  and 
post-entry rights linked with residence which, create to a fairly unrestricted space 
human mobility within Europe. I underline  fairly because it is not an absolute right. 
From the beginning, the treaties included safeguards that protect the interests of the 
member states from ‘unreasonable burden’ on the social assistance system (Article 
14 of the Directive 38/2004) (see Chap.  7 on Belgium) and allow them to restrict 
freedom of movement on grounds of public policy, public security and public health 
(Article 27.1). 
 The freedom of movement of people was established at early stages of European 
integration. In its original defi nition in the Treaty of Rome (1957) it established 
under Article 3 ‘the abolition, as between the member states, of obstacles to free-
dom of movement of persons, services and capital’ and took more than 10 years 
until it was implemented in 1968 with the Regulation 1612/1968. The policy was 
the result of convergence of interests between the Italy and the North-Western 
European countries, notes Moravcsik ( 1998 : 149): “Italy sought to export labour 
and the other [Northern European], especially Germany, sought to import it, so it 
was easy to agree in principle on freedom of movement”. Italy in particular argues 
Romero ( 1993 : 52), was keen in signing off the policy because of the emerging 
European employment market provided with a solution to the chronic unemploy-
ment and poverty that led to Italians’ mass emigration the turn of twentieth century 
(see Chap.  4 , this volume). Paradoxically, the promise of freedom of movement  for 
people announced in the Treaty of Rome that implied it would apply to all nationals 
was materialised into a labour mobility  for workers in 1968. Peo Hansen and Stefan 
Jonsson ( 2014 : 227–30) show that the change of wording from freedom of move-
ment for nationals to workers was determined in the negotiation leading to what we 
now know as the Treaty of Rome. France requested to integrate Algeria, who at the 
time was part of Metropolitan France, to the European Community. In this case, 
Italy was amongst the opponents. Algeria’s integration to the common market 
would have meant that its agriculture and especially Algerian workers who had 
French citizenship would now have competed with the Italian products and Italian 
workers. Algeria became an independent state before the implementation of free-
dom of movement but the early negotiations surrounding the Algerian case helped 
the member states understand that by replacing nationality with workers, they 
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gained some leeway in deciding who qualifi es for the worker status and under which 
conditions could they enjoy free mobility. 
 The initial introduction of freedom of movement of workers served both instru-
mental objectives of the European integration (Olsen  2008 ). At its early phase, inte-
gration focused on developing the economic advantages of the Union and on 
building the common market. Freedom of movement of workers complemented the 
freedoms of services, goods, capital and added substance to the common market. It 
also served the political objectives of the EU by creating a sense of unity, amongst 
the people of Europe, or a quasi-European demos and, therefore, legitimising the 
newly established Union. 
 Until the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), freedom of movement evolved consis-
tently and progressively expanding the groups of EU citizens who could enjoy these 
rights from workers and their families to economically non-active people with suf-
fi cient economic means to support themselves. These changes were implemented 
through a series of European Community regulations 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Generally, the regulations sought to 
amplify the scope of the freedom of movement to include students, pensioners and 
economically autonomous people. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) marked a mile-
stone in the evolution of freedom of movement: it elevated the status of freemovers 
to citizens of the European Union and introduced new political rights for the mobile 
Europeans. Bellamy and Warleigh ( 2005 ) note that provisions made by the Treaty 
of Maastricht sought to substantiate the single market and tackle the democratic 
defi cit between the citizens and the European elites. The freedom of movement 
expanded progressively until the mid 2000s when it culminated with the Directive 
38/2004, also known as the ‘Citizenship Directive’. 
 The Directive also established a right of permanent residence for Union citizens 
and did away with the exclusive relationship between freedom of movement rights 
and EU citizens by expanding them to third country nationals. Nevertheless, the 
latter were to benefi t of these rights freely as did the EU citizens but only under 
extraordinary circumstances: if and only if third country nationals complied with 
certain conditions requested by the member states. This last addition corrected what 
William Maas ( 2008 ) has called the ‘unfulfi lled promised’ of EU’s citizenship: its 
inability to extend the rights that Union citizens enjoyed since 1950s to long-term 
legal residents from third countries. In other words, what the Citizenship Directive 
achieves was to take further the legacy of Maastricht by consolidating the scope of 
freedom of movement and by expanded its associated rights; but, crucially and most 
importantly the Directive marked a fi rm move from the economic logic of market- 
minded freedom of movement that dominated the European agenda until Maastricht 
to the nation-building project of ‘making’ citizens and setting the basis for a 
European political community. 
 In addition to the large number of regulations, guidelines, statements and com-
munications from the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU henceforth) played an important role in interpreting the scope and 
limitations of both freedom of movement rights and Union citizenship through a 
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vast jurisprudence on these matters. CJEU interpreted Union citizenship as destined 
to become the  fundamental status rather than a  complementary status to the national 
citizenship. A series of the Court’s rulings 1 have consolidated this interpretation 
over time. The most remarkable example of the “court-driven empowerment” 
(Joppke  2010 : 171) of the Union citizenship is the CJEU’s decision in the  Grzelczyk 2 
case. The court reaffi rmed the right of a French-national student, Rudy Grzelczyk, 
who after 3 years of studying in Belgium and working to support himself through-
out his studies, to minimum subsistence allowance offered by the Belgian authori-
ties. The CJEU held as follows:
 [ U ] nion citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member 
states, enabling those who fi nd themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment 
in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided 
for. 3 
 In November 2014, the CJEU made a major decision on the rights to social pro-
tection for freemovers. In the landmark  Dano case, 4 CJEU has ruled that Union citi-
zens lose the right to access to certain social protection packages if after the fi rst 3 
months they do not fall under the categories protected by the Citizenship Directive: 
workers (be them dependent or self-employed), former workers or jobseekers. 
Elisabeta Dano, a Romanian Roma and lone mother in charge of a 5-year-old with 
whom she resided in Germany since 2011. Ms Dano was living with her sister who 
also providing for her fi nancially. At the time she made the new claim, Ms. Dano 
was already receiving two types welfare benefi ts in Germany – child benefi t and 
lone parent benefi t – and had applied for a third one, a special non-contributory cash 
benefi t known as basic provision under the SGB II. It is for this third type of benefi t 
that the Court decided that she was not entitled to claim it. The Court argued that Ms 
Dano was not eligible for this benefi t because, at the time of claiming the benefi ts 
she was neither a worker, a former worker or jobseeker. The Court noted that “it is 
apparent from the documents before the Court that Ms Dano has been residing in 
Germany for more than three months [at the time of making the claim] that she is 
not seeking employment and that she did not enter Germany in order to work” 
(Paragraph 66). 
 In September 2015, the Court ruled a restrictive decision in another case on EU 
citizens’ access to welfare rights. In Alimanovic, 5 the decision confi rmed that the 
1  Most notable from an extensive jurisprudence,  Ritter -  Coulais v Finanzamt Germersheim 
C-152/03, Case  Sala v Freistaat Bayern C-85/96, Case  Bindar v London Borough of Ealing 
C-209/03, Case  Trojani v CPAS C-465/02, Case  Ioannidis C-258/04. 
2  Case  Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d ’ aide sociale d ’ Ottingnies - Louvain - la Neuve , C-184/99. 
3  Emphasis added. Case C-184  Grzelczyk ibid, Para 31. 









member states can refuse social assistance to EU citizens who lose the status of 
Union workers. The Alimonovic family are Swedish citizens who resided in Berlin 
Germany. The family is composed by Nazifa the mother, Sonita elderly daughter 
and two minors still in the care of the mother: Valentina and Valentino. The family 
settled in Germany in early 1990s where the three children were born, but moved to 
Sweden in 1999. They returned to Germany in 2010. The mother and the older 
daughter worked on temporary contracts for nearly a year from June 2011 to May 
2012 after which they applied for unemployment benefi ts. When these were 
exhausted, they applied for social assistance for people in long-term unemployment 
(known as Arbeitslosengeld II). The Court ruled that Germany can stop these pay-
ments because neither the mother nor the daughter have managed to retain their 
status of Union workers. The directive specifi es that in order to retain the worker 
status, the EU citizens had to have worked for more than 1 year, laid off and regis-
tered with the relevant employment offi ce. Even in this case, the Union worker can 
retain the status for only 6 months. Both the mother and the daughter exhauseted the 
6 month period and therefore lost the status of Union worker. 
 Dano and  Alimanovic cases are transformational for European freedom of move-
ment beyond their legal consequences. Both rulings turn the light on the two ele-
ments of the freedom of movement that have been contested by the public and the 
far-right anti-immigration parties but which have slowly found their way on the 
agenda of mainstream political parties. The fi rst is the fact that free movement might 
mean unconditioned freedom to settle and the fact that freedom of movement would 
be used by some Europeans to “shop” for more generous welfare benefi ts than those 
of their countries of origin.  Dano and  Alimanovic spoke directly to growing angst 
with free movement and addressed heads-on both concerns. The decision stated 
black over white that host member states can indeed deny non-contributory benefi ts 
to freemovers and that they enjoy relative generous rights that come with freedom 
of movement for a period of 3 months. After this period, freemovers can retain these 
rights  if and only if they are workers, former workers, jobseekers or have enough 
fi nancial resources to be economically self-suffi cient. When freemovers do not hold 
such statuses, then they lose the rights established by the Directive. The Directive 
(Article 7.1) is clear on the right to reside after the fi rst 3 months is conditioned by 
freemovers’ fi nancial self-suffi ciency and “comprehensive sickness insurance” so 
that they or their family members do not become “a burden on the social assistance 
system in the host state”. While the European freedom of movement creates ample 
mobility rights (Article 5 in the Directive) and a wide set of rights for the fi rst 3 
months of residence (Article 6), freemovers’ need to meet the self-suffi ciency crite-
ria to retain these rights after the fi rst 3 months (Article 7). 
 The asymmetry in rights between before and after the 3 months period had cre-
ated public concern and confusion about freedom of movement and the  Dano and 
 Alimanovic doctrines have helped dispel them. In effect, these cases do nothing 
more than to switch the light and lay bare what seemed to be the best-kept secret 
on freedom of movement: its limits. While these limits have been part of the deal 
from the beginning, they have rarely entered the public debate on freedom of 
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movement and they were consistently omitted from the promotion campaigns of 
the European Commission that pushed for more intra-European mobility and 
focused on the special rights of the freemovers. Perhaps more importantly is that 
before  Dano and  Alimanovic , the limits of freedom of movement seldom have 
been enforced. However, these recent decisions of the CJEU have received much 
media attention and announce a period of retrenchment of freedom of movement 
rights. 
 In the following section, I explore the policy and political responses to freedom 
of movement in times of crisis and zoom-in on their consequences for the migration 
of Southern Europeans. 
2.4  Freedom of Movement, No More? Political Contestation 
of Freedom of Movement in Times of Crisis and How It 
Affects Southern European  en route to Northern Europe 
 Since the start of the economic crisis of 2007/2008, political and public discourse 
increasingly challenge the freedom of movement of people within EU as an abso-
lute right. Alarmed by the prospect of large infl ows from the Central and Eastern 
European member states upon the end of the transition restrictions, numerous politi-
cal leaders have spoken publicly on taking measures to ‘control’ migration from the 
other EU member states. The anticipation of the end of restrictions for Romanian 
and Bulgarian workers in January 2014 —while most European countries were fac-
ing their own internal economic crisis— triggered a wave of anti-immigration reac-
tions in the EU as well as outside of it (see Barbulescu  2014 ). 
 In the spring of 2013, ministers of four member states – UK, Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands-wrote a joint letter to the European Commission and Council 
[at that time under Irish Presidency] warning it of the fact that some cities in their 
countries were being put “under a considerable strain by certain immigrants from 
other member states” (Ministers of Interior of Austria, the Netherlands, UK and 
Germany  2013 ). The letter called for tougher controls for freemovers including effi -
cient repatriations and re-entry bans: “[a]ll necessary measures need to be taken to 
deal with the consequences of this type of immigration and to fi ght its causes. This 
includes legal as well as fi nancial measures.” Interestingly, the member states refer 
to freedom of movement as “this type of immigration” and pleads for new “legal” 
measures to tackle it. The letter is important because it makes visible an emergent 
coalition of freedom of movement hardliners amongst the North-Western EU mem-
ber states who, not accidently, have also been the main receivers of migration from 
the other member states. In response, a parallel coalition supporting freedom of 
movement emerged and brought the Scandinavian countries and the Central and 
Eastern European states together. The ministers of Sweden, Finland and Norway 
jumped in defence of freedom of movement in a joint letter set to the  Financial 
Times (January 2014). The elections for the European Parliament in May 2014 
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exported the heated debate on possible restrictions to freedom of movement rights 
to all member states. 
 What seemed a pro-mobility coalition between the new member states and the 
Scandinavian states collapsed with the arrival of the so-called “refugee crisis” in the 
summer of 2015. Central and Eastern European countries have shown antagonistic 
attitudes towards the freedom of circulation of refugees and asylum seekers. Some 
of the new member states refuted EU quotas for refugees and sought to seal off their 
borders as a way of preventing asylum seekers to enter. In reply, European Council 
President Tusk rang the alarm: “Let there be no doubt, the future of Schengen is at 
stake and time is running out. The clock is ticking, we are under pressure, we need 
to act fast” (Tusk  2015 ). Ironically, by threatening to quit the principle of freedom 
of movement for refugees and asylum seekers, the new member states put under risk 
the mobility of EU citizens including that of Central and European citizens who 
have been the main protagonists of intra-European mobility over the last decade. 
 Nonetheless, the strongest contestation of freedom of movement for EU citizens 
comes from the Northern European countries. For instance in the UK, in anticipa-
tion of the elections for the European Parliament as well as general elections, David 
Cameron declared that ‘free movement in EU needs to be less free’ (EUActive 
 2013 ) (for a full discussion on the UK, see Chap.  10 , this volume). The Dutch 
Socialist Deputy Prime Minister, Lodewijck Asscher, used the colour codes used to 
announce weather calamities and called for ‘orange alert’ in anticipation of 
EU labour migration (EUObserver  2013 ). The Commission replied arguing that the 
member states raised concerns about welfare tourism including abuses but have not 
submitted evidence to support its existence. Instead, the Commission replied by tak-
ing a technical fact-checking approach and commissioned an independent study 
(ICF GHK  2013 ) which suggested a set of actions seeking to help the member states 
combat welfare tourism and make the most of freedom of movement (EC  2013 ). 
The GHK report (2013) found minuscule numbers of EU citizens who do not work, 
who are not economically active but who receive benefi ts from another EU member 
state. They represented less than 1 % of all such benefi ciaries (of EU nationals) in 
six countries studied (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Malta and Portugal) and 
between 1 % and 5 % in fi ve other countries (Germany, Finland, France, The 
Netherlands and Sweden). Data obtained by  The Guardian on unemployment ben-
efi ts found that a similar number of EU citizens receive them as Brits in other EU 
countries (19 January 2015). 
 Calls for more control on freedom of movement is not new. Previous episodes in 
which freedom of movement has been contested were of lower intensity and, more 
importantly, they came from individual member states rather than a consolidated 
block of hardliners. Yet, I argue that they paved the way for the fi rst serious chal-
lenge that freedom of movement faced since its introduction. For instance, the evic-
tion of Roma effectively limited the rights of Roma EU citizens and led to their 
repatriation from Italy in 2008 and France in 2010 – a practice that continues to the 
present day. Freedom of movement was challenged also from the left for it 
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 depreciated workers’ rights and conditions by excluding posted workers from other 
European states to have the same protections local workers had. A series of rulings 
from the CJEU confi rmed the right of companies to contract posted workers under 
the same conditions as workers in their countries of origin rather than workers in the 
countries were they are employed. 6 
 The fact that member states’ initiatives and statements challenging freedom of 
movement remained largely unsanctioned from the Commission but were rewarded 
by the public had the unexpected effect of “normalising” the contestation. From this 
point onwards, it was only a matter of time before a coalition of member states 
would write to the Commission asking for new measures to better control the mobil-
ity from the other member states. 
 In the context of the economic crisis and enlargement  fatigue in the Northern 
Europe, individual member states have introduced new policy measures that de 
facto contract freedom of movement rights. UK and Germany have made changes 
that restrict access to social rights while Belgium has intensifi ed the number of 
expulsions for EU citizens (see Chaps.  7 ,  9 , and  10 in this book). The UK initially 
entertained the idea of quotas for migration from the other member states as it 
would help the Conservative Party meet its campaign pledge: to cap net migration 
including migration from EU to less than 100,000. However, the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel convinced David Cameron to retreat from setting a cap on EU 
migration (The Guardian  2014 ). Cameron also consulted with European Commission 
chief Jean-Claude Juncker before delivering the Staffordshire speech in which he 
announced the new measures. In Brussels, a European Commission spokesman 
reacted to the plan set by Cameron by saying that it was up to “national lawmakers 
to fi ght against abuses of the system and EU law allows for this.” 
 The recent talks about restrictions on freedom of movement also made their way 
in the European Parliament. A Spanish MEP, representing the newly established left 
wing party  Podemos inquired the Commission about the effects the recent policies 
announced by the Northern European states on the rights of Spaniards. Pablo 
Iglesias fi lled a written question for the Commission asking about the particular 
situation of Spanish citizens in Germany who according to a draft law provides for 
penalties of up to 3 years imprisonment for people in breach of the country’s resi-
dence conditions. The Commission responded reaffi rming that it would check 
whether the draft is compatible with EU law (EP Written Answers  2014 ). In addi-
tion, Switzerland who is an associated state has voted in February 2014 in a public 
referendum to limit freedom of movement by submitting the new arrivals to quotas. 
The European Commission has already declined Switzerland’s proposal to imple-
ment the quotas for migration from the other member states and presented the broad 
association agreement as one package that cannot be renegotiated separately. 
6  Case  Laval Un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2008] IRLR 160  C-341/05 




 It is important to mention here that the politicisation of freedom of movement is 
not restricted to Northern Europe, but a similar process occurs in Southern Europe 
especially in Italy and Spain where Romanians and Bulgarians have tended to 
migrate. However, in Southern Europe politicisation intensifi ed before and after the 
Eastward enlargements rather than at the time the transitional restrictions were 
lifted (Barbulescu  2013 ). 
 The once isolated challenges are slowing building into a consensus amongst the 
North-Western European states. The fact that the freedom of movement and not 
European citizenship is the target of contention shows that people have not appro-
priated the later in the same way as the former. Nonetheless, the emerging consen-
sus focuses on a freedom of movement with more safeguards for the receiving 
states. Ultimately, this new focus translates into the following dilemma: how can 
member states organise the migration of wanted migrants while keeping out the 
unwanted migrants. This dilemma is precisely the one that states, including those 
who lead the contestation on freedom of movement, face when seeking to control 
migration from outside the EU. Because policies on freedom of movement and 
international migration seek to achieve what is increasingly the same result, they are 
becoming more alike at the policy level. 
 The concern of political elites about migration were not new as they followed the 
Eastward EU enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2013. The economic crisis that started 
in 2007 has only aggravated this concern. It is important to mention here that public 
opinion and political leaders do not systematically target Southern Europeans in 
particular. Often, the raising numbers of Southern Europeans arriving in the North 
European countries since the start of the crisis have had little or no impact on the 
public opinion in the countries of destination and seldom featured in the media. An 
exception to this has economic liberal outlet,  The Economist that has published 
from a series of columns profi ling it: “They are coming: Hope for a better life is 
pushing young Europeans abroad” (13 September 2013) and “PIGS can fl y: Some 
European economic migrants are more welcome than others” (16 November 2013). 
From the point of view of migration scholarship, one of the puzzle is the invisibility 
of the new Southern European migration. In sharp contrast, in the countries of ori-
gin in Southern Europe, the new emigration has moved to the top of the public 
agenda inciting talks about a veritable “brain drain” and “exile” migration of the 
young professionals. 
 While Eastern Europeans and Roma in particular are the poster child for limiting 
freedom of movement, changes in this policy area such as the ones announced by 
the  Dano decision equally affect the Southern Europeans who are moving in times 
of crisis. More dramatic is that the rights as freemovers are called into question at a 
moment when Southern Europeans most need them to deal with the effects of the 
crisis. The impact on the ongoing contraction of freedom of movement rights is set 
to be higher for Southern Europeans. Unlike Central and Eastern Europeans, the 
young Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese or Greeks moving now to North-Western 
Europe have have grown up in a Europe in which mobility is free and is a defi ning 
feature of being in the EU. 
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2.5  Conclusions 
 Southern Europeans have been the pioneers of European freedom of movement 
establishing migratory routes connecting the South with the North of Europe in the 
postwar period. However, when these routes were initiated, Southern Europeans 
were mere international migrants recruited by the Northern European countries 
largely through guest worker schemes. The exception to this rule was Italy, which 
was a founding member of the EU. With time, European Union has expanded and 
together with it, European freedom of movement has strengthened and expanded to 
incorporate new rights. With the accession of Spain, Greece and Portugal to the EU, 
the migratory route lost its signifi cance only to re-emerge in the context of the eco-
nomic crisis. 
 However, this new migration of Southern Europeans comes at a time when free-
dom of movement is challenged in a number of member states. A coalition of mem-
ber states bringing together the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and, Austria —who 
share a hard line agenda on freedom of movement— have already taken action by 
introducing restrictive policies seeking to reduce access to social benefi ts, to effec-
tively expel homeless EU citizens and to extend the re-entry bans for offenders. We, 
therefore, observe a hollowing out of freedom of movement rights, as political con-
sensus builds up to limit rights associated with freedom of movement and in doing 
so, making it increasingly similar to international migration. While the contraction 
of freedom of movement rights and their systematic challenge have been triggered 
by the 2004, 2007 and, 2013 Eastward enlargements, Southern Europeans who 
chose to move to another member state since the start of the crisis will be equally 
affected by the ongoing changes. Brought up in the Europe in which freedom of 
movement was beyond doubt and even promoted by the member states and EU 
institutions, Southern Europeans see their rights endangered when they need them 
the most: to escape the fi nancial and austerity crisis in their countries. Freedom of 
movement or the euro, once emblematic achievements of European integration are 
being tested under the shock conditions of the most severe crisis in living history. 
The EU institutions still seem determined to paint freedom of movement in terms of 
win-win situation benefi ting sending and receiving member states alike. At the 
national level, however, the narratives on international migration and freedom of 
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